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differential topology lecture by John W. Milnor from the 1960’s: Topology from the Differentiable Viewpoint

  • A function that’s problematic for analytic continuations:
    image
    image
  • Definitions of smooth manifold, diffeomorphism, category of smooth manifolds
  • bicontinuity condition
  • two Euclidean spaces are diffeomorphic iff they have the same dimension
  • torus ≠ sphere but compact manifolds are equivalence-classable by genus
  • Moebius band is not compact
  • Four categories of topology, which were at first thought to be the same, but by the 60’s seen to be really different (and the maps that keep you within the same category):
    File:PDIFF.svg
    diffeomorphisms on smooth manifolds;
    http://24.media.tumblr.com/tumblr_m0w3euWhCY1qc38e9o3_1280.jpg
    Again I say: STRING THEORY MOTHAF**KAAAAAAAAAAS

    image
    image



    piecewise-linear maps on simplicial complexes;
    File:Piecewise linear function2D.svg
    File:NURBstatic.svg

    image
    homeomorphisms on sets (point-set topology)
    http://24.media.tumblr.com/tumblr_m8axt2pGdc1qc38e9o1_r1_1280.png

    http://25.media.tumblr.com/tumblr_m8axt2pGdc1qc38e9o2_1280.png

    image
    File:Topological vector space illust.svg

  • Those three examples of categories helped understand category and functor in general. You could work for your whole career in one category—for example if you work on fluid dynamics, you’re doing fundamentally different stuff than computer scientists on type theory—and this would filter through to your vocabulary and the assumptions you take for granted. Eg “maps” might mean “smooth bicontinuous maps” in fluid dynamics but non-surjective, discontinuous maps are possible all the time in logic or theoretical comptuer science. Functor being the comparison between the different subjects.
  • The fourth, homotopy theory, was invented in the 1930’s because topology itself was too hard.

    image
  • Minute 38-40. A pretty slick proof. I often have a hard time following, but this is an exception.
  • Minute 43. He misspeaks! In defining the hypercube.
  • Minute 47. Homology groups relate the category of topological-spaces-with-homotopy-classes-of-mappings, to the category of groups-with-homomorphisms.

That’s the first of three lectures. Also Milnor’s thoughts almost half a century later on how differential topology had evolved since the lectures:

Hat tip to david a edwards.

What I really loved about this talk was the categorical perspective. The talks are really structured so that three categories — smooth things, piecewise things, and points/sets — are developed in parallel. Better than development of the theory of categories in the abstract, I like having these specific examples of categories and how “sameness” differs from category to category.

(Source: simonsfoundation.org)




The category of categories as a model for the Platonic World of Forms by David A Edwards & Marilyn L Edwards

  • Thales (7th cent. BC) made the first universal statement (proof w/o regard to the gods or mythology, just from pure reason)
  • pre-Greek mathematics was essentially engineering maths.
  • I owe ya a post on the illiterates in chapter 2 of James Gleick’s The Information. He tells the story of some illiterates in outer Soviet Union. According to the tale, they basically do not abstract at all. No abstract reasoning, no properties ascribed to members of a class, and so on.

    It sounds kind of idyllic in the way of NYT tales of the Pirahã or Jill Bolte Taylor’s story of losing the logical half of her brain. I’m not sure if Thales set us on the path to Hell or Heaven.
  • Plato set for himself the [goal] of extending geometry [beyond] triangles and circles and such, to all of human thought. He failed, but his vision has come to pass.
  • Why did Lawvere succeed where Plato and Whitehead failed?
  • He had Descartes’ already-abstract notion of a function, along with
  • Eilenberg & Mac Lane’s notions of category and functor.
  • The definition of function for infinite sets is already implicit in the choice of “which set theory”.
  • Category theory, unlike earlier formalisations (think Peano arithmetic and Goedel’s proof), is stable to the “meta” step: you do 2-categories, you do n-categories … the abstraction is ultimately a k → k+1 kind of deal rather than a “And this is the ultimate finality!” kind of deal.




  • “X does something whilst preserving a certain structure”
  • “There exist deformations of Y that preserve certain properties”
  • “∃ function ƒ such that P, whilst respecting Q”

This common mathematical turn of phrase sounds vague, even when the speaker has something quite clear in mind.

  

Smeet Bhatt brought up this unclarity in a recent question on Quora. Following is my answer:

It depends on the category. The idea of isomorphism varies across categories. It’s like if I ask you if two things are “similar” or not.

  • “Similar how? you ask.

Think about a children’s puzzle where they are shown wooden blocks in a variety of shapes & colours. All the blocks that have the same shape are shape-isomorphic. All the blocks of the same colour are colour-isomorphic. All the blocks are wooden so they’re material-isomorphic.


In common mathematical abstractions, you might want to preserve a property like

after some transformation φ. It’s the same idea: “The same in what way?”

As John Baez & James Dolan pointed out, when we say two things are “equal”, we usually don’t mean they are literally the same. x=x is the most useless expression in mathematics, whereas more interesting formulæ express an isomorphism:

  • Something is the same about the LHS and RHS”.
  • “They are similar in the following sense”.

Just what the something is that’s the same, is the structure to be preserved.

 

A related idea is that of equivalence-class. If I make an equivalence class of all sets with cardinality 4, I’m talking about “their size is equivalent”.

Of course the set \texttt{ \{turkey, vulture, dove \} } is quite different to the set  \{ \forall \texttt{ cones,\ the\ plane,\ a\ sheaf\ of\ rings} \}  in other respects. Again it’s about “What is the same?” and “What is different?” just like on Sesame Street.

 

Two further comments: “structure” in mathematics usually refers to a tuple or a category, both of which mean “a space” in the sense that not only is there a set with objects in it, but also the space or tuple or category has mappings relating the things together or conveying information about the things. For example a metric space is a tuple  ( \texttt{ things, distances\ between\ the\ things } ) . (And: having a definition of distance implies that you also have a definition of the topology (neighbourhood relationships) and geometry (angular relationships) of the space.)

In the case of a metric space, a structure-preserving map between metric spaces would not make it impossible to speak of distance in the target space. The output should still fulfill the metric-space criteria: distance should still be a meaningful thing to talk about after the mapping is done.

 

I’ve got a couple drafts in my 1500-long queue of drafts expositing some more on this topic. If I’m not too lazy then at some point in the future I’ll share some drawings of structure-preserving maps (different “samenesses”) such as the ones Daniel McLaury mentioned, also on Quora:

  • Category: Structure-preserving mapsInvertible, structure-preserving maps

  • Groups: (group) homomorphism; (group) isomorphism
  • Rings: (ring) homomorphism; (ring) isomorphism
  • Vector Spaces: linear transformation, invertible linear transformation
  • Topological Spaces: continuous map; homeomorphism
  • Differentiable Manifolds: differentiable map; diffeomorphism
  • Riemannian Manifolds: conformal map; conformal isometry




John Baez and James Dolan, From Finite Sets to Feynman Diagrams

  • an explosion of ideas
  • equality x=x is boring
  • why is 6÷2=3 ?

(Source: arxiv.org)










Categorial decomposition of Galilean spacetime.

Sean Carroll tells us that it was Galileo who first si rese conto che motion can be separated into:

  • motion in the x direction — or x′[t]
  • motion in the y direction — or y′[t]
  • motion in the z direction — ż or z′[t]

and, importantly, that physical laws should be the same for all the 360° × 360° orthonormal choices of (x,y,z). It was Galileo’s idea that you can draw axes, that forces can be decomposed onto those axes, and that forces along one axis behave independently of each other.

For example if you kick a football, it goes forward x′[t], chips up y′[t], and bends left z′[t]. If you kicked it off a cliff, it would retain its exact same forward x'[t] speed even after it dropped y<0 below the plane of the cliff at an ever increasing speed. (NB: That’s not actually true, which is why we say “in a vacuum”.)

 

The traditional way to talk about a path γ is talking in tuples:

  • First, you have some points
  • Then, you have a 3-basis.
  • Then, you have an interval.
  • If you want to talk about kicking the ball, you would probably call the ball a point, say “there is” a vector space tangent to the ball, and your single kick of the ball constitutes a single force-vector applied (instantaneously) to the point, I mean ball. “Then” — by which I mean “at higher values of t∈interval” — the ball “is” chipped up in the air, “then” back on the ground.
  • The path γ is any member of the product (pairing) of 3-basis with interval.

path γ ∈ time × space*

* space in the geographer’s sense; the casual, not mathematical, sense of the word space. Lawvere calls mathematical space a “universe” … like the theoretical universe that the theory lives in

All of this “you have” — it’s a violation of E′. The “false subject” in English sentences that start with “There are” is repeated over, and over, and over again in mathematics (hence the invention of the symbol ∃).

 

Now cometh F William Lawvere, 3 centuries later, with a conceptual breakthrough.

path γ : time  space

The categoryists use labelled dots and labelled arrows to sketch concepts. So in pictures 2 and 3 you can see projection arrows splitting 3-space into a 2-plane (ground) and a 1-line (air). (Arrows sometimes seem backwards in category theory. Galileo projects 3D onto 1D + 2D, so something like “coprojection” would be the natural piecing together of independent sub-motions to get the full picture.)

And the Galileo example is just meant to be a shared thing we can all discuss. But this same thought-pattern — categorial decomposition — I can use on non-chalkboard things from my life as well. Gottman-style 2-eqn relationship dynamics; speculating about some economics in the news; love triangles; the deeper you plant this seed, the more places you see it.

(Source: amazon.com)










Category Theory for Programmers

  • redraw pictures of ƒ(A)=B so that the morphisms look like • and the objects look like →. Hey, why not?
  • string diagrams (process networks) are just as good as algebraic symbology
  • associativity
  • tensor products
  • if switch( switch( • )) ≠ • , then* you’ve got a braided category, which is described by the algebra of knots. “I’m not sure why you would want your programming language to include the algebra of knots at a basic level, but … you could.” I think braided code totally makes sense … in a visualising-a-big-system-of-code kind of way.

*Technically speaking: in Haskell it’s always true for every • input that switch( switch( • )) ≠ • . If we were talking about a language where switch( switch( • )) ≠ • is not always true — sometimes or possibly not true — then that language would be a braided category. ∃x | ¬ p(x) = ¬∀x p(x) — all symbols spoken in the subjunctive.

(Source: nuclearphynance.com)




The definition of toposes has surprisingly powerful consequences. (For example, toposes have all finite colimits.)

Probably the best analogy elsewhere in which a couple of mild-sounding hypotheses pick out a very narrow and interesting class of examples is the way in which the Cauchy-Riemann equations select the analytic functions from all smooth functions of a complex variable.

Michael Barr & Charles Wells, Toposes, Triples, and Theories (p 64)