- $150 billion per year is spent on text messaging.
- Recorded music is a $17 billion market
- Yearly box office receipts are $32 billion
- Video games $7 billion
(And the SMS market was created completely by accident.)
Posts tagged with business
- $150 billion per year is spent on text messaging.
- Recorded music is a $17 billion market
- Yearly box office receipts are $32 billion
- Video games $7 billion
(And the SMS market was created completely by accident.)
(Source: economist.com)

49 Plays
An interesting story about industrial rail in the United States. About 20 mins. From The Economist.

- Europe has an impressive and growing network of high-speed passenger links
- America’s freight railways are one of the unsung transport successes of the past 30 years.
- Before deregulation America’s railways were going bust. … By 1980 a fifth of rail mileage was owned by bankrupt firms.
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- Since 1981 productivity has risen by 172%, after years of stagnation. Adjusted for inflation, rates are down by 55%
- Coal is the biggest single cargo, accounting for 45% by volume and 23% by value.
- since 1990 the average horsepower of their fleet has risen by 72%
- [since 1990] the number of ton-miles per (American) gallon of fuel [rose] from 332 to 457—an improvement of 38%
- But the fastest-growing part of rail freight has been “intermodal” traffic: containers or truck trailers loaded on to flat railcars. The number of such shipments rose from 3m in 1980 to 12.3m in 2006, before the downturn caused a slight falling back.
- one freight train can carry as much as 280 lorries can


Lucas’ “rational expectations” revolution in macroeconomics has been tied to the ending of stagflation in the world’s largest economy, and to the reintroduction of “psychology” into finance and economics. However, I never felt like the models of “expectation” I’ve seen in economics seem like my own personal experience of living in ignorance. I’d like to share the sketch of an idea that feels more lifelike to me.

First, let me disambiguate: the unfortunate term-overlap with “statistical expectation” (= mean = average = total over count = ∑ᵢᴺ•/N = a map from N dimensions to 1 dimension) indicates nothing psychological whatever. It doesn’t even correspond to “What you should expect”.
If I find out someone is a white non-Hispanic Estadounidense (somehow not getting any hints of which state, which race, which accent, which social class, which career track…so it’s an artificial scenario), I shouldn’t “expect” the family to be worth $630,000. I “expect” (if indeed my expectation is not a distribution but rather just one number) them to be worth $155,000. (scroll down to green)
Nor, if I go to a casino with 99% chance of losing €10,000 and 1% chance of winning €1,000,000 (remember the break-even point is €990,000). “On average” this is a great bet. But that ignores convergence to the average, which would be slow. I’d need to play this game a lot to get the statistics working in my favour, and I mightn’t stay solvent (I’d need to get tens of millions of AUM—with lockdown conditions—to even consider this game). No, the “statistical expectation” refers to a long-run or wide-space convergence number. Not “what’s typical”.
Not only is the statistical expectation quite reductive, it doesn’t resemble what I’ve introspected about uncertainty, information, disinformation, beliefs, and expectations in my life.
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A better idea, I think, comes from the definition of Riemann integration over 2+ dimensions. Imagine covering a surface with a coarse mesh. The mesh partitions the surface. A scalar is assigned to each of the interior regions inscribed by the mesh. The mesh is then refined (no lines taken away, only some more added—so some regions get smaller/more precise and no regions get larger/less precise), new scalars are computed with more precise information about the scalar field on the surface.
NB: The usual Expectation operator 𝔼 is little more than an integral over “possibilities” (whatever that means!).
(In the definitions of Riemann integral I’ve seen the mesh is square, but Voronoi pictures look awesomer & more suggestive of topological generality. Plus I’m not going to be talking about infinitary convergence—no one ever becomes fully knowledgeable of everything—so why do I need the convenience of squares?)
I want to make two changes to the Riemannian-integral mesh.


First I’d like to replace the scalars with some more general kind of fibre. Let’s say a bundle of words and associations.
(You can tell a lot about someone’s perspective fro the words they use. I’ll have to link up “Obverse Words”, which has been in my drafts folder for over a year, once I finish it—but you can imagine examples of people using words with opposite connotation to denote the same thing, indicating their attitude toward the thing.)
Second, I’d like to use the topology or covering maps to encode the ignorance somehow. In my example below: at a certain point I knew “Rails goes with Ruby” and “Django goes with Python” and “Git goes with Github” but didn’t really understand the lay of the land. I didn’t know about git’s competitors, that you can host your own github, that Github has competitors, the more complex relationship between ruby and python (it’s not just two disjoint sets), and so on.
When I didn’t know about Economics or Business or Accounting or Finance, I classed them all together. But now they’re so clearly very very different. I don’t even see Historical Economists or Bayesian Econometricians or Instrumental Econometricians or Dynamical Macroeconomists or Monetary Economists or Development Economists as being very alike. (Which must imply that my perspective has narrowed relative to everyone else! Like tattoo artists and yogi masters and poppy farmers must all be quite different to the entire class of Economists—and look even from my words how much coarse generalisation I use to describe the non-econ’s versus refinement among the econ’s.
These meshes can have a negative curvature (with, perhaps a memory) if you like. You know when you think that property actuaries are nothing at all like health actuaries that your frame-of-reference has become very refined among actuary-distinguishment. Which might mean a coarse partitioning of all the other people! Like Bobby Fischer’s use of the term “weakies” for any non-chess player—they must all be the same! Or at least they’re the same to me.)

Besides the natural embedding of negatively-curved judgment grids, here are some more pluses to the “refinement regions” view of ignorance:
In conclusion, I’m sure everyone on Earth can agree that this is a Really Nifty and Cool Idea.

I’ll try to give a colourful example using computers and internet stuff since that’s an area I’ve learned a lot more about over the past couple years.
First, what does ignorance sound like?
HMTL, sure!”OK, but I wasn’t that bad. In workplaces I’ve been the person to ask about computers. I even briefly worked in I.T. But the distance from “normal people” (no computer knowledge) to me seems very small now compared to the distance between me and people who really know what’s up.
A few years ago, when I started seriously thinking about trying to make some kind of internet company (sorry, I refuse to use the word “startup” because it’s perverted), I considered myself a “power user” of computers. I used keyboard shortcuts, I downloaded and played with lots of programs, I had taken a C++ course in the 90’s, I knew about C:\progra~1 and how to get to the hidden files in the App packages on a Mac.
My knowledge of internet business was a scatty array of:
![Wait, forgot to escape a space. Wheeeeee[taptaptap]eeeeee. Regular Expressions](http://imgs.xkcd.com/comics/regular_expressions.png)

sudo apt-get install
So I knew I didn’t know everything, but it was very hard to quantify how much I did know, how far I had to go.

A mediocre picture of some things I knew about at various levels. It’s supposed to get across a more refined knowledge of, for example, econometrics, than of programming. Programming is lumped in with Linux and rich programmer kids and “that kind of stuff” (a coarse mesh). But statistical things have a much richer set of vocabulary and, if I could draw the topology better, refined “personal categories” those words belong to.
Which is why it’s easier to “quantify” my lack of knowledge by simply listing words from the neighbourhood of my state of knowledge.
Unfortunately, knowing how long a project should take and its chances of success or potential pitfalls, is crucial to making an organised plan to complete it. “If you have no port of destination, there is no favourable wind”. (Then again, no adverse wind either. But in an entropic environment—with more ways to screw up than to succeed—turning the Rubik’s cube randomly won’t help you at all. Your “ship” might run out of supplies, or the backers murder you, etc.)

Here are some of the words I learned early on (and many more refinements since then):



This is only—as they say—“the tip of the iceberg”. I didn’t know a ton of server admin stuff. I didn’t understand that libraries and frameworks are super crucial to real-world programming. (Imagine if you “knew English” but had a vocabulary of 1,000 words. Except libraries and frameworks are even better than a large vocabulary because they actually do work for you. You don’t need to “learn all the vocabulary” to use it—just enough words to call the library’s much larger program that, say, writes to the screen, or scrapes from the web, or does machine learning, for you.)
The path should go something like: at first knowing programming languages ⊃ ruby. Then knowing programming languages ⊃ ruby ⊃ rubinius, groovy, JRuby. At some point uncovering topological connections (neighbourhood relationships) to other things (a comparison to node.js; a comparison to perl; a lack of comparability to machine learning; etc.)

I could make some analogies to maths as well. I think there are some identifiable points across some broad range of individuals’ progress in mathematics, such as:






∫ , ‖•‖, {x | p} — there might be a point at which chalkboards full of multiple integrals look like the pinnacle of mathematical smartness—


I think you’ll agree with me here: the more one learns, the more one finds out how little one knows. One can’t leave one’s context or have knowledge one doesn’t have. And all choices are embedded in this framework.

via n-morgan:
… they’re facing each other in court over a rebranding accusation. They’re locked in a legal and public relations fight in the United States over a plan to change the name of the toxic and healthy sweeter, high-fructose corn syrup (HFCS).

I don’t think so, for the following reasons:
I realise this argument is incomplete. Just because there’s room to grow doesn’t mean we’ll get there. However I think this line of reasoning may prove productive even if my version of it doesn’t get quite there. So let’s press on.
Half a century after Solow, many economists and rest-of-us still think of economic growth as an exogenous “magical” process driven by abstract words such as “technology” or “skill” or “trade” or “innovation”—rather than as the macro sum of correct micro decisions taken by individuals at the company two towns over.

Some of that surely is to blame on things like Y=C+I+G+NX. Everything “the government” spends is G—regardless of whether it’s spent on a really good idea, implemented well, or on a pie-in-the-sky promise of a half-price incinerator with huge cost overrun. This is like “economists’ K working to constrain our thinking”. Or like the Mpemba effect where one first assumes temperature is one-dimensional (false) and then infers that “you have to go through here to get to there”.
I prefer to think about a time-varying graph
With this model it’s less tempting to use abstract words like “technology” without getting more specific. Clearly this new highway will reduce transit times for many of the transaction-edges. And therefore reduce costs broadly, ergo growth. But its effects are (a) localised to those who touch that edge (or an edge that touches that edge) (b) helping some more than others (even hurting a few on net) and [c] rather than being inevitable, come from the good work of individuals, who could have screwed it up. Now it’s tempting to, rather than wish for some magical entrepreneurs or inventors, look at ordinary decisions; not divide the world into “government vs private enterprise”; consider the individuals in particular places who are helped or hurt rather than an average … basically I find this much more grounded and less prone to theoretical histrionics.
Instead of focussing on growth as a 1-D number (Mpemba), trying to correlate it with size of government or regress it against “trust index” or “ethnofract index” or other abstract highfalutins, the GDP number can only be gotten by integrating all the micro elements—which is, I think, as it should be. Then instead of counting on the magical 2% number to stay around 2% year after year, it’s nicely surprising if the total value of transactions this year was again at its record historical high. And when people can squeeze even a higher total of value throughput through the year (out of what? out of natural resources? out of ingenuity? out of Saudi muppets?) you have to wonder where that growth came from—if it was from a sequence of very old “industrial revolutions” or from many companies doing things a little better this year than they did last year. (¬∀, but on net.)
Will smart machines make low-wage jobs redundant?
P Krugman asserts in his blog post about Robert Gordon’s paper
machines may soon be ready to perform many tasks that currently require large amounts of human labor. …[I]t’s all too easy to make the case that most Americans will be left behind, because smart machines will end up devaluing the contribution of workers, including highly skilled workers whose skills suddenly become redundant.
So: yes, armies of back-office pencil-pushers have been replaced in the IT revolution by computers. Thank goodness: what a boring, repetitive worklife. But besides record-keeping and verification and copying and automated checking of things, what is it that humans do that’s been replaced by machines? Travel agents? Brick-and-mortar stores with poor selection and high prices? A lot of things computers are good at, like spidering the web, is not something that we previously paid humans to do.
For example Indeed.com, a billion-dollar company created within the last decade, uses electronic computation, networks, and O(100) software engineers to usefully index job search results from disparate sources across the Web. Who lost that job? This is basically a billion-dollar free lunch vis-à-vis unemployment.
Another example that comes to mind is the auto-scan machines at the grocery store. These machines actually make a single clerk more productive. Not that her wages went up necessarily, but the efficiency of the economy did.
So why do peole think automation will replace low-wage jobs? If it’s based on evidence rather than me sitting on my couch and spitballing I’m willing to listen. But from my armchair I see people computing electronic tasks that no human used to do, Siri computing what the iPhone users said, Toyota and NewBalance augmenting humans with machines, machine learning/AI/statistical forecasting making digital things better but again not disemploying anyone.
Despite the appeal of using widespread unemployment as a basis for dystopian fiction, I don’t see anyone scrambling at the profit opportunity to make window-washing droids, janitorial droids, pizza-delivery droids, anything that requires operating in a broad ambiente. The machines seem to be great for repeating the same task in a well-defined scenario, same as factory robots at the Toyota since decades ago.

It was a very micro cap business I started with a credit card and £1000 borrowed from a friend. I had just a few recurring expenses and one big initial investment. Ended up with about 8 part-time employees by the peak. A lot of people think I shut it down because of problems with the government. But actually it was because I took an unrelated outside risk—investing time in an Internet startup—which didn’t pay off and took too much time away from my main business, so I had to shut it down.
My three motivations or main reasons I started it were:
So I did not make a lot of money doing this business, which by definition makes it not a great business. But I did support myself, I did accomplish my goals (to learn, to not lose money, and to employ at least some people at a notably higher wage than they could make elsewhere), and I did make my community a more vibrant place, during the time I was working at it.
During the period I was doing that I definitely felt “Anybody could do something like this. Not necessarily make a lot of money but add something new to their community. Sure, it’s a lot of butt busting work, but at least I’m giving an effort.” Maybe what I missed in that “lecture” was that most people in fact do not want to work their butts off for not so much money. It’s in fact much more attractive to have a guarantee that no matter how bad things get you will still get this much money traded for also fixed hours. And maybe that is amplified in rationality because mainly the companies offering variable pay are usually some startup that will fail and therefore they offer “sweat equity” i.e. unquantified ownership of a worthless company. Or maybe I was actually just quite lucky to have experience working at a company that I guessed I might be able to replicate without a lot of up-front capital. That was an assumption I was aware was flawing my “lecture” even at the time.
The other reason it’s probably not smart to encourage others to “Just do something” is that planning, thinking things through beforehand, and developing expertise that can shut down competitors must have more value in a more difficult market or a higher market cap.
