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Posts tagged with Daron Acemoglu

memeengine replied to your post: Or can the influence of any ancestor ever fade down to zero? (Or, well… to arbitrarily small size?)

An AR[1] process can go arbitrarily ↓0 as time↑∞. But in real life the sins of the fathers set their childrens’ teeth on edge in a stiffer, more heriting, architectural way. (I was alluding to that with the new-parents post scriptum.)

I don’t know of any “grande classes of models” wherein you stay stuck from where the past put you, but for example you could say

  • if ($income >= 10 guineas) { $opportunities = 1000; } else { $opportunities = 3; }.
 

I’m neither an expert on history nor do I find the econometrics super compelling, but ∃ some theories of the past carving out a channel for the future.

  • In central Africa — the form of governance from 1000, 1500, 1800 AD still has an influence on GDP per capita today. Even once you statistically control for other “obvious” determinants of production power. (Here I learned the interesting term “ethnofract”—a measure of ethnic disparity.)
  • In the southeastern US — a county’s history of slave-holding has statistical relevance to. (Nathan Nunn is a co-author.)
  • In socialist Sweden — the class mobility from generation to generation is greater than in free-market United States.
  • According to Arvind Thornton, north-western European social norms of family size, structure, and intra-/inter-relationships set the stage for “industrial revolution” type anti-Malthusian family structures that inform major subcultures all over the OECD today. I.e., a small nuclear family wherefrom kids form their own families in a separate home; high value placed upon individualism; etc. 
  • In British-colonial Jamaica and French-colonial Haiti, an oligarchic political form in the 1700’s passed on poverty to its ‘fterbears. Sugar plantations financed European vacations, fine liberal educations, and leisure for the elites, but sugar is not an investment in the future. Indeed, growth markets might have overthrown the political structure by empowering the hands, so the positive-sum games were forestalled by the landed interests. (Story can be found on Daron Acemoglu’s website.)
  • (A similar argument has been applied to Europe in the Needham question: why did Europeans dominate the globe rather than Asians, when the Asians were ahead earlier on in the race? Perhaps because of the over-powerful Chinese government.)
  • In Louisiana, USA — juridical forms differ from the other 49 States. Since Louisiana’s French colonial history bequeathed it a civil-law rather than a common-law system of justice, not just its laws but the underlying reasoning for how they’re executed, differs orthogonally to other interstate legal variations.
  • Come to think of it: any common-law system, by design, to carve a river that the future will follow.

In all of the statistical examples we’ve got to ask if it’s possible to statistically control for parameter changes. To which the correct answer is: No. Well, maybe. Um, in a local sense any parameter change can be estimated as linear. If the underlying function is ≥once-differentiable. So, err. I’ll have to get back to you on that.

(I’ll look up paper links later…if you as a reader know the papers or related ones you could also do me the favour and post links in the Reply or Disqus Comments. =) )




21 Plays • Download

Economic inequality — its effect on politics.

Minute 44

  1. Senators’ opinions correlate well with the opinions of their most affluent constituents.
  2. Senators’ opinions do not correlate with the opinions of the poorest third of their constituency.
  3. Senators’ opinions correlate a little with the opinions of the middle third.

SOURCE: Neil Butta, via Acemoglu on Econtalk
"GSE Activity and Mortgage Supply in Lower-Income and Minority Neighborhoods: The Effect of the Affordable Housing Goals" 




Some day I want to read all of Daron Acemoglu’s work. What in here isn’t interesting?

  • Social Structure and Development - A Legacy of the Holocaust in Russia
  • Theory, General Equilibrium, Political Economy and Empirics in Development Economics
  • Experimentation, Patents and Innovation Spread of (Mis)Information in Social Networks
  • Political Selection and Persistence of Bad Governments
  • Emergence and Persistence of Inefficient States
  • Vertical Integration and Technology: Theory and Evidence
  • Skills, Tasks and Technologies: Implications for Employment and Earnings
  • Persistence of Civil Wars
  • Dynamic Mirrless Taxation Under Political Economy Contraints
  • Institutions, Factor Prices and Taxation: Virtues of Strong States?
  • Political Limits to Globalization Price and Capacity Competition Foundations of Social Inequality (alternate access) http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/reprint/326/5953/678.pdf
  • When Does Policy Reform Work - The Case of Central Bank Independence
  • A Theory of Military Dictatorships
  • Reevaluating the Modernization Hypothesis
  • Do Juntas Lead to Personal Rule?
  • Productivity Differences Between and Within Countries
  • Determinants of Vertical Integration: Financial Development and Contracting Costs
  • Economic and Political Inequality in Development: The Case of Cundinamarca, Colombia
  • Input and Technology Choices in Regulated Industries - Evidence from the Health Care Sector
  • Coalition Formation in Non-Democracies Income and Democracy
  • Capital Deepening and Nonbalanced Economic Growth
  • Local Indices for Degenerate Variational Inequalities Political Economy of Mechanisms
  • Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions Oligarchic vs. Democratic Societies Markets Versus Governments
  • Incentives in Markets, Firms and Government Disease and Development: The Effect of Life Expectancy on Economic Growth
  • Disease and Development: The Effect of Life Expectancy on Economic Growth Appendices B and C
  • On the Stability of P-Matrices
  • Competition in Parallel-Serial Networks Partially Optimal Routing
  • Competition and Efficiency in Congested Markets
  • Generalized Poincare-Hopf Theorem for Compact Nonsmooth Regions
  • Equilibrium Bias of Technology Contracts and Technology Adoption
  • Technology, Information and the Decentralization of the Firm
  • Appendix to Technology, Information and the Decentralization of the Firm
  • A Simple Model of Inefficient Institutions
  • De Facto Political Power and Institutional Persistence
  • Did Medicare Induce Pharmaceutical Innovation? Modeling Inefficient Institutions
  • Efficiency and Braess’ Paradox under Pricing in General Networks
  • Price Competition in Communication Networks Competition in Parallel-Serial Networks Distance to Frontier, Selection, and Economic Growth
  • Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective
  • Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth
  • Constitutions, Politics and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini’s “The Unbundling Institutions The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change and Economic Growth”
  • From Education to Democracy?
  • Market Size in Innovation: Theory and Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry
  • Women, War and Wages: the Effect of Female Labor Supply on Labor Market Outcomes
  • Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule (The Alfred Marshall Lecture)
  • The Marginal User Principle for Resource Allocation in Wireless Networks
  • Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment and Politics
  • Disease and Development in Historical Perspective
  • Patterns of Skill Premia Labor- and Capital-Augmenting Technical Change
  • An African Success Story: Botswana
  • Factor Prices and Technical Change: from Induced Innovations to Recent Debates
  • The Labor Market and Corporate Structure Institutional Causes, Macroeeconomic Symptoms: Volatility, Crises and Growth
  • Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World
  • Directed Technical Change
  • The World Income Distribution Technical Change, Inequality, and The Labor Market
  • The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation
  • Inefficient Redistribution
  • A Theory of Political Transitions
  • Consequences of Employment Protection? The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act
  • Deunionization, Technical Change and Inequality
  • Credit Market Imperfections and Persistent Unemployment
  • Changes in the Wage Structure, Family Income, and Children’s Education
  • Productivity Differences
  • Good Jobs Versus Bad Jobs
  • Wage and Technology Dispersion
  • Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality and Growth in Historical Perpective
  • Political Losers as a Barrier to Economic Development
  • How Large Are Human Capital Externalities Evidence? Evidence from Compulsory Schooling Laws
  • The Choice between Market Failures and Corruption Productivity
  • Gains from Unemployment Insurance
  • Democratization or Repression? Certification of Training and Training Outcomes
  • Efficient Unemployment Insurance
  • Changes in Unemployment and Wage Inequality: An Alternative Theory and Some Evidence
  • Holdups and Efficiency Search Frictions
  • The Structure of Wages and Investment in General Training
  • Information Accumulation in Development
  • Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labour Markets
  • Why Do New Technologies Complement Skills? Directed Technical Change and Wage
  • Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach
  • Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence
  • Credit Market Imperfections and the Separation of Ownership from Control
  • Asymmetric Business Cycles: Theory and Time Series Evidence
  • Was Prometheus Unbound by Chance? Risk, Diversification, and Growth
  • Training and Innovation in an Imperfect Labour Market
  • Matching, Heterogeneity, and the Evolution of Income Distribution
  • A Microfoundation for Social Increasing Returns in Human Capital Accumulation
  • Asymmetric Information, Bargaining, and Unemployment Fluctuations
  • Reward Structures and the Allocation of Talent

(Source: mit.edu)